When is Market Incompleteness Irrelevant for the Price of Aggregate Risk (joint with Dirk Krueger, UPenn) by Hanno Lustig
When is Market Incompleteness Irrelevant for the Price of
Aggregate Risk (and when is it not)? ∗
Dirk Krueger†
University of Pennsylvania, CEPR and NBER
Hanno Lustig‡
UCLA Anderson and NBER
April 14, 2008
Abstract
In a model with a large number of agents who have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
preferences, market incompleteness has no eﬀect on the premium for aggregate risk if the dis-
tribution of idiosyncratic risk is independent of aggregate shocks and aggregate consumption
growth is distributed independently over time. In the equilibrium, which features trade and
binding solvency constraints, as opposed to Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996), households only
use the stock market to smooth consumption; there is no trade in bond markets. Furthermore,
we show that the cross-sectional wealth and consumption distributions are not aﬀected by
aggregate shocks. These results hold regardless of the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks. A
weaker irrelevance result survives when we allow for predictability in aggregate consumption
growth.
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This paper provides general conditions under which closing down insurance markets for idiosyn-
cratic risk (our deﬁnition of market incompleteness) does not increase the risk premium that stocks
command over bonds. We study a standard incomplete markets endowment economy populated
by a continuum of agents who have CRRA preferences and who can trade a risk-free bond and a
stock, subject to potentially binding solvency constraints. In the benchmark version of our model
the growth rate of the aggregate endowment is uncorrelated over time, that is, the logarithm of
aggregate income is a random walk. Under these assumptions, the presence of uninsurable idiosyn-
cratic risk is shown to lower the equilibrium risk-free rate, but it has no eﬀect on the price of
aggregate risk in equilibrium if the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is statistically independent
of aggregate shocks. Consequently, we show analytically that in this class of models, the represen-
tative agent Consumption-CAPM (CCAPM) developed by Rubinstein (1974), Breeden (1979) and
Lucas (1978) prices the excess returns on the stock correctly. Therefore, as long as idiosyncratic
shocks are distributed independently of aggregate shocks, the extent to which household can insure
against idiosyncratic income risk as well as the tightness of the borrowing constraints they face are
irrelevant for risk premia. These results deepen the equity premium puzzle, because we show that
Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) statement of the puzzle applies to a much larger class of incomplete
market models.1 We also show that uninsurable income risk does not contribute to any variation
in the conditional market price of risk.
While earlier work exploring autarchic equilibria by Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) is sugges-
tive of the irrelevance of idiosyncratic (consumption) risk, our work derives the exact conditions for
the irrelevance of uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk in non-autarchic equilibria for economies
with standard labor income processes while allowing for binding borrowing constraints. We show
that these conditions depend critically on the properties of aggregate consumption growth once
one allows for trade.2
The stark asset pricing implications of our model follow from a crucial result about equilibrium
consumption and portfolio allocations. We show that in this class of incomplete market models
with idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, the equilibrium allocations and prices can be obtained from
the allocations and interest rates of an equilibrium in a stationary model with only idiosyncratic
risk (as in Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994)). We call this the Bewley model.
1Weil’s (1989) statement of the risk-free rate puzzle, on the contrary, does not.
2There are few general theoretical results in this literature. Levine and Zame (2002) show that in economies
populated by agents with inﬁnite horizons, the equilibrium allocations converge in the limit, as their discount factors
approach one, to the complete markets allocations. We provide a qualitatively similar equivalence result that applies
only to the risk premium. Our result, however, does not depend at all on the time discount factor of households.
For examples of numerical solutions of calibrated models, see the important work of Ayiagari and Gertler (1991),
Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Krusell and Smith (1998), and Marcet and Singleton (1999).
Also see Kocherlakota (1996) for an overview of this literature.
2Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that scaling up the consumption allocation of the Bewley equilibrium
by the aggregate endowment delivers an equilibrium for the model with aggregate risk. In this
equilibrium, there is no trade in bond markets, only in stock markets. This result is the key
to why the history of aggregate shocks has no bearing on equilibrium allocations and prices.
Households in equilibrium only trade the stock (i.e. the market portfolio), regardless of their history
of idiosyncratic shocks, even in the presence of binding solvency constraints. This invariance of the
household’s portfolio composition directly implies the irrelevance of the history of aggregate shocks
for equilibrium prices and allocations. The wealth and consumption distribution in the model with
aggregate risk (normalized by the aggregate endowment) coincides with the stationary wealth and
consumption distribution of the Bewley equilibrium. Aggregate shocks therefore have no impact
on these equilibrium distributions.
Due to the absence of aggregate risk in the Bewley model, a bond and a stock have exactly
the same return characteristics in equilibrium and thus one asset is redundant. Households need
not use the bond to smooth consumption. Remarkably, this prediction for portfolio allocations
carries over to the model with aggregate risk: at the equilibrium prices households do not trade
the uncontingent bond and they only use the stock (i.e. a claim to aggregate consumption), to
transfer resources over time. In equilibrium, all households bear the same share of aggregate risk
and they all hold the same portfolio, regardless of their history of idiosyncratic shocks and the
implied ﬁnancial wealth holdings. Hence, this class of models does not generate any demand for
bonds at the equilibrium interest rate, if bonds are in zero net supply.3 If there was some household
that wanted to hold bonds at the equilibrium interest rate, then all households would want to go
long in bonds, and the bond market could not be cleared. Hence in equilibrium, no household
holds bonds.
Our portfolio result depends on the properties of aggregate consumption growth. In our bench-
mark model, aggregate consumption growth is not predictable (that is, the growth rate of the
aggregate endowment is i.i.d.). This is a standard assumption in the asset pricing literature (e.g.
Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), because the empirical evidence for such predictability is rather
weak (see e.g. Heaton and Lucas (1996)). However, if there is predictability in aggregate income
growth in our model, as in the model with long-run risk developed by Bansal and Yaron (2004),
then agents want to hedge their portfolio against interest rate shocks, creating a role for trade
in a richer menu of assets. The risk premium irrelevance result goes through only if households
can trade a full set of aggregate state-contingent claims and if the solvency constraints do not
bind. In this case, there is scope for trade in the contingent bond markets, because the hedging
3In our model, what we refer to as the stock is a claim to aggregate consumption. We show this is the only
security households trade. However, if we take equity to be a levered claim to aggregate consumption, then the
households eﬀectively hold a ﬁxed portfolio of corporate bonds and stocks. As is easy to verify, the proportion
of corporate bonds in the portfolio is 2/3 when corporate leverage is 2. The remaining 1/3 is in equities. A key
implication of the equilibrium we derive is that households do not deviate from these ﬁxed proportions.
3demands depend on the household’s history of idiosyncratic shocks. So, only a weaker form of
our result survives predictability in aggregate consumption growth. In contrast, in the autarchic
equilibria examined by Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996), the irrelevance result does not depend
on the properties of aggregate consumption growth because households by construction do not use
assets to hedge against predictable changes in consumption.
The key ingredients underlying our irrelevance result are (i) a continuum of agents, (ii) CRRA
utility, (iii) idiosyncratic labor income risk that is independent of aggregate risk, (iv) a constant
capital share of income and (v) solvency constraints or borrowing constraints on total ﬁnancial
wealth that are proportional to aggregate income. We now discuss each of these assumptions in
detail to highlight and explain the diﬀerences with existing papers in the literature.
First, we need to have a large number of agents in the economy. As pointed out by Denhaan
(2001), in an economy with a ﬁnite number of agents, each idiosyncratic shock is by construction
an aggregate shock because it changes the wealth distribution and, through these wealth eﬀects,
asset prices. Second, our results rely on the homotheticity property of the CRRA utility function.
Third, in our model labor income grows with the aggregate endowment, as is standard in this liter-
ature. In addition, for our results to go through, idiosyncratic income shocks must be distributed
independently of aggregate shocks. This explicitly rules out that the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks is higher in recessions (henceforth we refer to this type of correlation as countercyclical
cross-sectional variance of labor income shocks, or CCV). Fourth, we require that the capital share
of income is independent of the aggregate state of the economy. This assumption is standard in
macroeconomics, and it is not obviously at odds with the data (see Cooley and Prescott (1995)).
Finally, in the main section of the paper, households face either constraints on total net wealth
today or state-by-state solvency constraints on the value of their portfolio in each state tomor-
row.4 These solvency constraints have to be proportional to aggregate income. This assumption
is standard in the literature. For example, the liquidity constraints used by Deaton (1991) satisfy
this condition, as do the tight borrowing constraints used by Krusell and Smith (1997), and the
endogenous solvency constraints derived by Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we lay out the physical environment of our
model. In section 3, we consider the benchmark model without predictability in aggregate con-
sumption growth. We show that the prices and allocations in a model without aggregate risk,
called the Bewley model, can be mapped into the equilibrium prices and allocations of an economy
with aggregate risk in which households trade only a bond and a stock. This result then imme-
diately implies that market incompleteness is irrelevant for risk premia. In section 4, we allow
4However, in the case in which aggregate consumption growth is uncorrelated over time, we can allow for arbitrary
separate constraints on the household bond positions, e.g. a short-sale constraint for bonds only. In this case, our
result is also robust to the introduction of transaction costs in the bond market (but not to transaction costs in the
stock market).
4for predictability in aggregate consumption growth. Finally, section 5 concludes; all proofs are
contained in the appendix. In a separate appendix, downloadable from the authors’ web sites5, we
show these results survive when idiosyncratic income shocks are permanent, when labor supply is
endogenous, and when households have Epstein-Zin preferences.
2 Environment
Our exchange economy is populated by a continuum of individuals of measure 1. There is a
single nonstorable consumption good. The aggregate endowment of this good is stochastic. Each
individual’s endowment depends, in addition to the aggregate shock, also on the realization of an
idiosyncratic shock. Thus, the model we study is identical to the one described by Lucas (1994),
except that ours is populated by a continuum of agents (as in Bewley (1986), Aiyagari and Gertler
(1991), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994)), instead of just two agents.
2.1 Representation of Uncertainty
We denote the current aggregate shock by zt ∈ Z and the current idiosyncratic shock by yt ∈ Y .
For simplicity, both Z and Y are assumed to be ﬁnite. Furthermore, let zt = (z0,...,zt) and
yt = (y0,...,yt) denote the history of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. As shorthand notation,
we use st = (yt,zt) and st = (yt,zt). We let the economy start at an initial aggregate node z0.
Conditional on an idiosyncratic shock y0 and thus s0 = (y0,z0), the probability of a history st
is given by πt(st|s0). We assume that shocks follow a ﬁrst order Markov process with transition
probabilities given by π(s′|s).
2.2 Preferences and Endowments














where γ > 0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and β ∈ (0,1) is the constant time discount
factor. We deﬁne U(c)(st) to be the continuation expected lifetime utility from a consumption









5where we made use of the Markov property the underlying stochastic processes. The economy’s
aggregate endowment process {et} depends only on the aggregate event history; we let et(zt) denote
the aggregate endowment at node zt. Each agent draws a ‘labor income’ share η(yt,zt), as a fraction
of the aggregate endowment in each period. Her labor income share only depends on the current





where st = (st−1,yt,zt). We assume that η(yt,zt) > 0 in all states of the world. The stochastic
growth rate of the endowment of the economy is denoted by λ(zt+1) = et+1(zt+1)/et(zt). We assume
that aggregate endowment growth only depends on the current aggregate state.
Condition 2.1. Aggregate endowment growth is a function of the current aggregate shock only:
λ(z
t+1) = λ(zt+1).
Furthermore, we assume that a Law of Large Numbers holds6, so that π(st|s0) is not only a
household’s individual probability of drawing a history st, but also the deterministic fraction of
the population drawing that same history.
In addition to labor income, there is a Lucas tree that yields a constant share α of the total
aggregate endowment as capital income, so that the total dividends of the tree are given by αet(zt)
in each period. The remaining fraction 1 − α is labor income. Therefore, by construction, the
aggregate labor share of equals the sum over all individual labor income shares:
 
yt∈Y
Πzt(yt)η(yt,zt) = (1 − α), (3)
for all zt, where Πzt(yt) represents the cross-sectional distribution of idiosyncratic shocks yt, condi-
tional on the aggregate shock zt. By the law of large numbers, the fraction of agents who draw y in
state z only depends on z. An increase in the capital income share α translates into proportionally
lower individual labor income shares η(y,z) for all (y,z).7
At time 0, the agents are endowed with initial wealth θ0. This wealth represents the value of an
agent’s share of the Lucas tree producing the dividend ﬂow in units of time 0 consumption, as well
as the value of her labor endowment at date 0. We use Θ0 to denote the initial joint distribution
of wealth and idiosyncratic shocks (θ0,y0).
6See e.g. Hammond and Sun (2003) for conditions under which a LLN holds with a continuum of random
variables.
7Our setup nests the baseline model of Heaton and Lucas (1996), except for the fact that they allow for the
capital share α to depend on z. In their benchmark parameterization, however, ﬂuctuations in α(z) are rather small..
6Next, we assume that idiosyncratic shocks are independent of the aggregate shocks. This
assumption is crucial for most of the results in this paper.
Condition 2.2. Individual endowment shares η(yt,zt) are functions of the current idiosyncratic
state yt only, that is η(yt,zt) = η(yt). Also, the transition probabilities of the shocks can be decom-
posed as
π(zt+1,yt+1|zt,yt) = ϕ(yt+1|yt)φ(zt+1|zt).
This means that individual endowment shares and the transition probabilities of the idiosyn-
cratic shocks are independent of the aggregate state of the economy z.
In the baseline model, we also assume that the aggregate shocks are independent over time.
Condition 2.3. The growth rate of the aggregate endowment is i.i.d.:
φ(zt+1|zt) = φ(zt+1).
In this case the logarithm of the aggregate endowment follows a random walk with drift.
3 No Predictability in Aggregate Consumption Growth
In this section we assume that condition 2.3 holds so that aggregate endowment and thus consump-
tion growth is i.i.d. aggregate consumption growth shocks. First, analyze the model with Arrow
market structure in which households can trade shares in the stock and a complete menu of claims
that pay out contingent on the aggregate shock. Idiosyncratic shocks are (as in the entire paper)
uninsurable. We ﬁrst establish an equivalence result: we demonstrate that equilibrium allocations
and prices of a stationary version of the model with only idiosyncratic, but no aggregate shocks
(which we label the Bewley model) can be transformed, through simple scaling by the aggregate
shock, into equilibrium allocations and prices in the Arrow model with aggregate risk. In that
equilibrium a zero trade result for all contingent claims is obtained. This zero trade result, in turn,
implies that equivalence result for the Arrow model directly extends to the Bond model, in which
households can only trade a single uncontingent bond, in addition to the stock. We conclude this
section with the risk premium irrelevance result which follows directly from the fact that consump-
tion allocations in the model with aggregate risk are equal to consumption allocations from the
model with only idiosyncratic risk, scaled up by the same factor for all households (the stochastic
aggregate endowment)..
73.1 The Arrow Model
Let at(st,zt+1) denote the quantity purchased of a security that pays oﬀ one unit of the consumption
good if aggregate shock in the next period is zt+1, irrespective of the idiosyncratic shock yt+1. Its
price today is given by qt(zt,zt+1). In addition, households trade shares in the Lucas tree. We use
σt(st) to denote the number of shares a household with history st = (yt,zt) purchases today and
we let vt(zt) denote the price of one share.
An agent starting period t with wealth θt(st) buys consumption commodities in the spot market











If next period’s state is st+1 = (st,yt+1,zt+1), her wealth is given by her labor income, the payoﬀ
from the contingent claim purchased in the previous period as well as the value of her position in
the stock, including dividends:
θt+1(s








In addition to the budget constraints, the households’ trading strategies are subject to solvency
constraints of one of two types. The ﬁrst type of constraint imposes a lower bound on the value of


















t,zt+1) for all zt+1. (7)
While we can handle potentially very tight solvency constraints we need to assume that they are
proportional to the aggregate endowment.
Condition 3.1. The solvency constraints lie between the natural solvency constraints (the maxi-

























t,zt+1) = ˆ Mt(y
t)et+1(z
t+1).
The solvency constraints are not so tight as to make the feasible consumption set empty, but
they are tight enough to prevent Ponzi schemes. If the constraints did not have the proportion-
ality feature in a stochastically growing economy, they would become more or less binding as the
aggregate economy grows, clearly not a desirable feature.8. Obviously, the tight standard liquidity
constraint Kt(yt,zt) = 0 satisﬁes this condition (see Deaton (1991)).
In a competitive equilibrium households optimize, given prices, and for each zt the goods
market, the stock market and all markets for the Arrow securities clear (for a formal deﬁnition see
section A of the Appendix).
3.2 The De-trended Arrow Model
In order to establish our equivalence result we ﬁrst show how to transform the Arrow model with
idiosyncratic and aggregate risk into a stationary model with only idiosyncratic risk. The mapping
from the stochastically growing to a detrended stationary model involves a change of measures
that is similar but not identical to the switch to a risk-neutral measure commonly used in asset
pricing.
Transformation of the Model with Aggregate Shocks into a Stationary Model We
transform the Arrow model with aggregate shocks into a stationary model with a stochastic time
discount factor and a growth-adjusted probability matrix, following Alvarez and Jermann (2001).
We let ˆ U(ˆ c)(st) denote the expected lifetime continuation utility in node st, under the new transition






t) = u(ˆ ct(s
t)) + ˆ β(st)
 
st+1
ˆ π(st+1|st)ˆ U(ˆ c)(s
t,st+1), (8)









8Without this assumption, for example, the risk-free rate would depend on the level of aggregate consumption,
which in turn follows a random walk. In the incomplete markets asset pricing literature the borrowing constraints
usually satisfy this condition (see e.g. Heaton and Lucas (1996)).
9ˆ π is a well-deﬁned Markov matrix in that
 
st+1 ˆ π(st+1|st) = 1 for all st. Given the independence
condition (2.2), the growth-adjusted probability matrix ˆ π and the re-scaled discount factor are
obtained by adjusting only the transition probabilities for the aggregate shock, φ, but not the
transition probabilities for the idiosyncratic shocks:




Furthermore, the growth-adjusted discount factor only depends on the aggregate state zt:





We assume that maxzt ˆ β(zt) < 1 in order to insure that lifetime utility remains ﬁnite. Evidently
this jointly restricts the time discount factor β, the endowment growth process and the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion γ. Since aggregate shocks are i.i.d. in the baseline model, in this case the
growth-adjusted discount factor is a constant: ˆ β(zt) = ˆ β, since ˆ φ(zt+1|zt) = ˆ φ(zt+1) for all zt.
In the appendix we prove that this transformation does not alter the agents’ preference ranking
over diﬀerent consumption streams.
Proposition 3.1. Households rank consumption share allocations ˆ c = c
e in the de-trended model
in exactly the same way as they rank the corresponding consumption allocations c in the original




t) ⇐⇒ ˆ U(ˆ c)(s
t) ≥ ˆ U(ˆ c
′)(s
t).
This result is crucial for showing that we can compute the equilibrium allocations c for the
stochastically growing model by solving for equilibrium allocations ˆ c in the detrended model.
Trading Using hats ˆ to denote the variables in the stationary model we divide the budget


















where we have deﬁned the deﬂated Arrow positions as ˆ at(st,zt+1) =
at(st,zt+1)
et+1(zt+1) and prices as
ˆ qt(zt,zt+1) = qt(zt,zt+1)λ(zt+1). The deﬂated stock price is given by ˆ vt(zt) =
vt(zt)
et(zt). Similarly,

















t) for all zt+1. (12)
Finally, the goods market clearing condition is given by:




t)dΘ0 = 1. (13)
Note that the conditional probabilities simplify due to condition (2.2). In the detrended model, the
household maximizes ˆ U(ˆ c)(s0) by choosing consumption, Arrow securities and shares of the Lucas
tree, subject to the budget constraint (10) and the solvency constraint (11) or (12) in each node st.
The deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium in the de-trended Arrow model is now straightforward.
Deﬁnition 3.1. For initial aggregate state z0 and distribution Θ0 over (θ0,y0), a competitive equi-
librium for the de-trended Arrow model consists of trading strategies {ˆ at(θ0,st,zt+1)}, {ˆ σt(θ0,st)},
{ˆ ct(θ0,st)} and prices {ˆ qt(zt,zt+1)}, {ˆ vt(zt)} such that
1. Given prices, trading strategies solve the household maximization problem
2. The goods market and asset markets clear, that is, equation (13) holds for all zt and









t,zt+1)dΘ0 = 0 for all zt+1 ∈ Z
The ﬁrst order conditions and complementary slackness conditions, together with the appropri-
ate transversality condition, are listed in the appendix in section (A.1). These are necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for optimality on the household side. We will now argue that these conditions
are identical to those obtained in a version of the model without any aggregate risk (which we
name the Bewley model).
3.3 The Bewley Model
In this model the aggregate endowment is constant and equal to 1. Households face idiosyncratic
shocks y that follow a Markov process with transition probabilities ϕ(y′|y). The household’s pref-
erences over consumption shares {ˆ c(yt)} are deﬁned in equation (8), with a constant time discount
factor ˆ β as deﬁned in equation (9).
11Market Structure In this model without aggregate risk agents trade only a riskless one-period
discount bond and shares in a Lucas tree that yields safe dividends of α in every period. The
price of the Lucas tree at time t is denoted by ˆ vt.9 The riskless bond is in zero net supply. Each
household is indexed by an initial condition (θ0,y0), where θ0 denotes its wealth (including period
0 labor income) at time 0.
The household chooses consumption {ˆ ct(θ0,yt)}, bond positions {ˆ at(θ0,yt)} and share holdings







t)ˆ vt = η(yt) + ˆ at−1(y
t−1) + ˆ σt−1(y
t−1)(ˆ vt + α).
Finally, each household faces one of two types of borrowing constraints. The ﬁrst one restricts
household wealth at the end of the current period. The second one restricts household wealth at




t)ˆ vt ≥ ˆ Kt(y
t) for all y
t. (14)
ˆ at(y
t) + ˆ σt(y
t)(ˆ vt+1 + α) ≥ ˆ Mt(y
t) for all y
t. (15)
The deﬁnition of equilibrium in this model is standard:
Deﬁnition 3.2. For an initial distribution Θ0 over (θ0,y0), a competitive equilibrium for the
Bewley model consists of trading strategies {ˆ ct(θ0,yt),ˆ at(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)}, and prices { ˆ Rt,ˆ vt} such
that
1. Given prices, trading strategies solve the household maximization problem
2. The goods markets and asset markets clear in all periods t















9The price of the tree is obviously nonstochastic due to the absence of aggregate risk.
10We suppress dependence on θ0 for simplicity whenever there is no room for confusion.
11This distinction is redundant in the Bewley model, but it is useful for establishing our equivalence results below.
12In the absence of aggregate risk, the bond and the stock are perfect substitutes for households,
and no-arbitrage implies that the stock return equals the risk-free rate:
ˆ Rt =
ˆ vt+1 + α
ˆ vt
.
In addition, at these equilibrium prices, household portfolios are indeterminate. Without loss of
generality one can therefore focus on trading strategies in which households only trade the stock,
but not the bond: ˆ at(θ0,yt) ≡ 0.
A stationary equilibrium in the Bewley model consists of a constant interest rate ˆ R, share
price ˆ v, optimal household allocations and a time-invariant measure Φ over income shocks and
ﬁnancial wealth.12 In the stationary equilibrium, households move within the invariant wealth
distribution, but the wealth distribution itself is constant over time. Now we are ready to establish
the equivalence between equilibria in the Bewley model and in the Arrow model.
3.4 Equivalence I: No Trade in Markets for Arrow Securities
Equilibria in the Bewley model without aggregate risk can be transformed into equilibria of the
Arrow model with aggregate risk.
Theorem 3.1. An equilibrium of the Bewley model {ˆ ct(θ0,yt),ˆ at(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)} and { ˆ Rt, ˆ vt} can
be implemented as an equilibrium for the Arrow model with growth, {at(θ0,st,zt+1)}, {σt(θ0,st)},
{ct(θ0,st)} and {qt(zt,zt+1)}, {vt(zt)}, with
ct(θ0,s




t) = ˆ σt(θ0,y
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at(θ0,s




















The proof of this result is given in the appendix; here we provide its main intuition. Conjecture






An unconstrained household’s Euler equation for the Arrow securities in the (detrended) Arrow
12See Chapter 17 of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) for the standard formal deﬁnition and the straightforward
algorithm to compute such a stationary equilibrium.










But, in light of conditions (2.2) and (2.3) and given our conjecture that consumption allocations in
the de-trended Arrow model only depend on idiosyncratic shock histories yt and not on st = (yt,zt),
this Euler equation reduces to







where we used the conjectured form of prices in (17). This is exactly the same Euler equation
for bonds in the Bewley model. Since Bewley equilibrium consumption allocations satisfy this
condition, they also satisfy the Euler equation in the de-trended Arrow model, if prices are of the
form (17). Hence the equivalence.
The proof in the appendix shows that a similar argument applies to the Euler equation for the
stock (under the conjectured stock prices). We also show that, in the case of binding solvency
constraints, the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints in the Bewley equilibrium are also valid
multipliers for the constraints in the de-trended Arrow model. Hence, the equivalence result goes
through regardless of how tight the solvency constraints are.
Once one has established that allocations and prices of a Bewley equilibrium are an equilibrium
in the de-trended Arrow model, one simply needs to scale up allocation and prices by the appro-
priate growth factors to obtain the equilibrium prices and allocations in the stochastically growing
Arrow model, as stated in the theorem.
It is straightforward to compute the equilibrium risk-free interest rates for the Arrow model. By
summing over aggregate states tomorrow on both sides of equation (17), we ﬁnd that the risk-free







= ˆ Rt. (18)
We can then back out the implied interest rate for the original growing Arrow model, using (16)
in the previous theorem.












zt+1 φ(zt+1)λ(zt+1)−γ . (19)
14The theorem implies that we can solve for equilibria in the Bewley model of section 3.3 (and,
in particular, a stationary equilibrium), including risk free interest rates ˆ Rt, and we can deduce
the equilibrium allocations and prices for the Arrow model from those in the Bewley model, using
the mapping described in theorem 3.1. The key to this result is that households in the Bewley
model face exactly the same Euler equations (at equilibrium prices) as households in the de-trended
version of the Arrow model.
In the Arrow equilibrium that we propose, the contingent bond holdings are simply proportional
to the aggregate endowment: at(θ0,st,zt+1) = ˆ at(θ0,yt)et+1(zt+1). Equivalently, in the de-trended
Arrow model households choose not to make their Arrow securities purchases contingent on next
period’s aggregate shock: ˆ at(θ0,st,zt+1) = ˆ at(θ0,yt). Furthermore, without loss of generality we
can set the bond holdings to zero ˆ at(θ0,yt) = 0 in the Bewley model. In that case there is no trade
in Arrow securities at all in the equivalent Arrow equilibrium: at(θ0,st,zt+1) = 0.
We will use this equivalence result to show below that asset prices in the Arrow model are
identical to those in the representative agent model, except for a lower risk-free interest rate (and
a higher price/dividend ratio for stocks).13
3.5 Equivalence II: No Trade in Uncontingent Bond Markets
The equivalence result stated in Theorem 3.1 carries over to a model with aggregate risk in which
only a discount bond and a stock are traded. We call this the Bond model. The no-trade result for
contingent claims directly implies that agents in the Bond model optimally choose bond positions
in equilibrium that are given by:
bt(θ0,y
t,z
t) = ˆ at(θ0,y
t)et(z
t) = 0.
Equilibria in the Bewley model can then be transformed into equilibria of the stochastically growing
Bond model, just like for the Arrow model.14
Corollary 3.2. An equilibrium of the Bewley model {ˆ ct(θ0,yt),ˆ at(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)} and { ˆ Rt,ˆ vt}
can be implemented as an equilibrium for the Arrow model with growth, {bt(θ0,st)}, {σt(θ0,st)},
13Our equivalence theorem has two other implications. First, the existence proofs in the literature for stationary
equilibria in the Bewley model directly carry over to the stochastically growing model. Second, the moments of the
wealth distribution vary over time but proportionally to the aggregate endowment. If the initial wealth distribution
in the de-trended model corresponds to an invariant distribution in the Bewley model, then -for example- the ratio
of the mean to the standard deviation of the wealth distribution is constant over time and across states of the world
in the Arrow model with aggregate risk.
14See the separate appendix available at http://www.econ.upenn.edu/˜dkrueger/research/assetpricingapp.pdf for
a complete description of the model and formal proofs of the results..
15{ct(θ0,st)} and {Rt(zt)}, {vt(zt)}, with
ct(θ0,s




t) = ˆ σt(θ0,y
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bt(θ0,s





















There is one diﬀerence between this result and the corresponding result for the Arrow model.
In the Arrow model we demonstrated that contingent claims positions were in fact uncontingent:
ˆ at(θ0,st,zt+1) = ˆ at(θ0,yt) and equal to the Bond position in the Bewley equilibrium. It was not
necessary, however, to set them to zero. Since bonds in the Bewley equilibrium are a redundant
asset, one can without loss of generality restrict attention to the situation where ˆ at(θ0,yt) = 0, but
this is not necessary for our results in the Arrow model. In the Bond model bond positions have to










t−1)[ˆ vt + α],
where the deﬂated bond position is ˆ b(yt) = b(yt)/et(zt). Bond holdings   bt(yt−1) = 0 need to be
zero for all yt−1, even if all the consumption, portfolio choices and prices, are independent of the
aggregate history zt, simply because the bond return in the deﬂated economy depends on the
aggregate shock zt through λ(zt). This demonstrates the irrelevance of the history of idiosyncratic
shocks yt for portfolio choices in this model. There is no link between ﬁnancial wealth and the
share of this wealth being held in equity.
3.6 Asset Pricing Implications
By making use of our equivalence results it is now straightforward to derive our main asset pricing
result: the multiplicative risk premium on a claim to aggregate consumption in both the Bond
model and the Arrow model equals the risk premium in the representative agent model. Uninsur-
able idiosyncratic income risk only lowers the risk-free rate, but does not aﬀect the risk premium
at all.
Consumption-CAPM The benchmark model of consumption-based asset pricing is the repre-
sentative agent Breeden-Lucas (BL) model. The representative agent owns a claim to the aggregate
‘labor’ income stream {(1 − α)et(zt)} and she can trade a stock (a claim to the dividends αet(zt) of
16the Lucas tree), a bond and a complete set of Arrow securities. First, we show that the Breeden-
Lucas Consumption-CAPM also prices excess returns on the stock in the Bond model and the
Arrow model. Let Rs denote the return on a claim to aggregate consumption. We have
Lemma 3.1. The BL Consumption-CAPM prices excess returns in the Arrow model and the Bond










where βλt+1(zt+1)−γ = mRE
t+1(zt+1) is the stochastic discount factor in the BL representative agent
(RE) model.
This result follows directly from subtracting the Euler equations for the bond from that for
the stock in both models. This result has important implications for empirical work in asset
pricing. First, despite the existence of market incompleteness and binding solvency constraints,
an econometrician can estimate the coeﬃcient of risk aversion (or the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution) directly from aggregate consumption data and the excess return on stocks, as in
Hansen and Singleton (1982), if the Bond model or the Arrow model is the true model of the real
world. Second, the result provides a strong justiﬁcation for work trying to explain the cross-section
of excess returns using the CCAPM, without necessarily trying to match the risk-free rate. As we
show here, the implications of the BL, the Arrow and the Bond model are identical with respect
to excess returns, but not with respect to the risk-free rate.
Risk Premia We now show that the equilibrium risk premium in the Arrow and the Bond model
is identical to the one in the BL representative agent model. While the risk-free rate is higher in the
BL representative agent model than in the Arrow and Bond model, and consequently the price of
the stock is correspondingly lower, the multiplicative risk premium is the same in all three models
and it is nonstochastic.
In order to demonstrate our main asset pricing result we ﬁrst show that the stochastic discount
factors that price stochastic payoﬀs in the BL representative agent model and the Arrow (and thus
the Bond) model only diﬀer by a non-random multiplicative term, equal to the ratio of (growth-
deﬂated) risk-free interest rates in the two models.













The proof that risk premia are identical in the representative agent model and the Arrow as
well as the Bond model follows directly from the previous decomposition of the stochastic discount
factor. Let Rt,j [{dt+k}] denote the j-period holding return on a claim to the endowment stream
{dt+k}
∞
k=0 at time t. Consequently Rt,1 [1] is the gross risk-free rate and Rt,1 [αet+k] is the one-period
holding return on a k-period strip of the aggregate endowment (a claim to α times the aggregate
endowment k periods from now). Thus Rt,1 [{αet+k}] is the one period holding return on an asset
(such as a stock) that pays α times the aggregate endowment in all future periods. Finally, we
deﬁne the multiplicative risk premium as the ratio of the expected return on stocks and the risk-free
rate:




With this notation in place, we can state now our main asset pricing result.
Theorem 3.2. The multiplicative risk premium in the Arrow model and Bond model equals that
in the representative agent model
1 + ν
A
t = 1 + ν
B
t = 1 + ν
RE
t ,
and is constant across states of the world.
Thus, the extent to which households smooth idiosyncratic income shocks in the Arrow model
or in the Bond model has absolutely no eﬀect on the size of risk premia; it merely lowers the risk-
free rate. Market incompleteness does not generate any dynamics in the conditional risk premia
either: the conditional risk premium is constant.
4 Predictability in Aggregate Consumption Growth
In this section, we investigate how robust our results are to the assumption that endowment growth
is i.i.d over time. We show that our results remain valid even when aggregate endowment growth
is serially correlated, but only for the Arrow model, and only if the solvency constraints (i) do not
bind or (ii) are judiciously chosen (reverse-engineered).
Assume that the aggregate shock z follows a ﬁrst order Markov chain characterized by the
transition matrix φ(z′|z) > 0. So far we studied the special case in which φ(z′|z) = φ(z′). Recall












Thus if φ is serially correlated, so is ˆ φ, and the discount factor ˆ β now does depend on the current
aggregate state of the world. This indicates (and we will show this below) that the aggregate
endowment shock acts as an aggregate taste shock in the de-trended model which renders all
households simultaneously more or less impatient. Since this shock aﬀects all households in the
same way, they will not able to insure against it. As a result, this shock aﬀects the price/dividend
ratio and the interest rate, but it leaves the risk premium unaltered. In contrast to our previous
results, however, now there is trade in contingent bonds in equilibrium, so the equivalence between
equilibria in the Arrow and the Bond model breaks down.
4.1 The Bewley Model
We apply the same strategy to show our results as before. The equilibrium allocations and prices
in the Bewley model can be implemented, after appropriate scaling by the aggregate endowment,
as equilibria in the stochastically growing model. However, since the time discount factors are
subject to an aggregate shock, we ﬁrst have to choose an appropriate nonstochastic time discount
factor for this Bewley model. We choose a sequence of non-random time discount factors such
that the Bewley equilibrium allocations satisfy the time zero budget constraint in the model with
aggregate shocks when the initial wealth distribution Θ0 in the two models coincide.
Let
ˆ β0,τ(z
τ|z0) = ˆ β(z0)ˆ β(z1)... ˆ β(zτ)
denote the time discount factor between period 0 and period τ + 1, given by the product of one-
period stochastic time discount factors. We deﬁne the average (across aggregate shocks) time
discount factor between period 0 and t as:





t−1|z0),t ≥ 1, (21)
where   φ(zt−1|z0) is the (conditional on z0) probability distribution over zt−1 induced by φ(z′|z). If
aggregate shocks are i.i.d, then we have that   βt = ˆ βt, as before. Since z0 is a ﬁxed initial condition,
we chose not to index   βt by z0 to make sure it is understood that   βt is nonstochastic.
In order to construct equilibrium allocations in the model with aggregate shocks, we will show






can be implemented as equilibrium allocations and interest rates for
19the actual Arrow model with stochastic discount factors. The crucial adjustment in this mapping
is to rescale the risk-free interest rate in proportion to the taste shock ˆ β(z).
To understand the eﬀect of these aggregate taste shocks on the time discount factor to be used
in the Bewley model, consider the following simple example.
Example 4.1. Suppose that ˆ β(z) = e−ˆ ρ(z) is lognormal and i.i.d, where ˆ ρ(z) has mean ˆ ρ and
variance σ2. Deﬁne the average t-period time discount rate   ρt by the equation   βt = e−  ρt. Then the
average one-period discount rate used in the Bewley model is given by:
  ρt
t




2 for any t ≥ 1
The presence of taste shocks (σ2 > 0) in the de-trended Arrow model induces a discount rate   ρ in
the Bewley model that is lower than the mean discount rate ˆ ρ because of the risk associated with
taste shocks.
This example shows that the taste shocks (originating from serially correlated endowment
growth rates) tend to lower the risk-free interest rates compared to a model without taste shocks.









. Only the total wealth
positions in the Bewley model are uniquely pinned down. Without loss of generality, we focus on
the case where ˆ at(θ0,yt) = 0 for all yt. We now argue that the allocation {ˆ ct(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)} can
be made into an Arrow equilibrium, and in the process we show why we need to choose the speciﬁc











denote the Bewley equilibrium price of one unit of consumption to be delivered at time τ, in terms
of consumption at time t. By convention ˜ Qτ = ˜ Q0,τ and ˜ Qτ,τ = 1 for all τ. In other words, ˆ Rt,τ is
the gross risk-free interest rate between period t and τ in the Bewley equilibrium.
4.2 The Detrended Arrow Model
In contrast to the Bewley model, the de-trended Arrow model features aggregate shocks to the
time discount factor ˆ β. These need to be reﬂected in prices. We therefore ﬁrst conjecture state-
dependent equilibrium prices for the de-trended Arrow model. Then we show that the Bewley
equilibrium allocations satisfy the Euler equations of the detrended Arrow model when evaluated
at these prices, and that they also satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint in the de-trended
Arrow model. This implies that, absent binding solvency constraints, the Bewley equilibrium can
20be implemented as an equilibrium of the de-trended Arrow model, and thus, after the appropriate
scaling, as an equilibrium of the original Arrow model. Finally, we discuss potentially binding
solvency constraints and the Bond model.
We conjecture that the Arrow-Debreu prices in the deﬂated Arrow model are given by
ˆ Qt(z







  βt ˆ R0,t
, (23)
where ˜ Qt was deﬁned above as the time 0 price of consumption in period t in the Bewley model.











where we used the fact that 1
ˆ Rt =
ˆ R0,t
  R0,t+1. Arrow prices are Markovian in zt, since ˆ Rt and (  βt,   βt+1)







ˆ qt(zt+1|zt) = ˆ Rt
  βt+1
ˆ β(zt)  βt
. (25)
Interest rates in the detrended Arrow model now depend on the current aggregate state of the
world zt. Finally, we conjecture that the stock price in the de-trended Arrow model satisﬁes:
ˆ vt(z










Armed with these conjectured prices we can now prove the following result.
Lemma 4.1. Absent solvency constraints, the household Euler equations are satisﬁed in the Arrow
model at the Bewley allocations {ˆ ct+1(yt,yt+1)} and prices for Arrow securities {ˆ qt(zt+1|zt)} given
by (24).
4.3 Trade in Arrow Securities Markets
Next, we spell out which asset trades support the Bewley equilibrium consumption allocations in
the de-trended Arrow model. The Arrow security positions implied by the Bewley allocations are
not zero, but they are zero on average across households and hence clear the asset markets.
At any point in time and any node of the event tree, the Arrow securities position, plus the
value of the stock position cum dividends, has to ﬁnance the value of excess demand from today
into the inﬁnite future. Thus, the Arrow securities position implied by the Bewley equilibrium
21allocation {ˆ ct(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)} is given by:
ˆ at−1(θ0,y
t−1,z
t) = ˆ ct(θ0,y











t−1)[ˆ vt(zt) + α] (27)
Proposition 4.1. The Arrow securities positions implied by the Bewley allocations in (27) clear
the Arrow securities markets, that is





t)dΘ0 = 0 for all z
t.
Since the wealth from stock holdings at the beginning of the period
ˆ σt−1(θ0,y





has to ﬁnance future excess consumption demand in the Bewley equilibrium, we can state the
























τ|zt) −   Qt,τ
 
The Arrow security portfolios held by households are used to hedge against the interest rate shocks
that govern the diﬀerence between the stochastic state prices ˆ Qτ(zτ|zt) and the deterministic prices
  Qt,τ. If aggregate endowment growth is i.i.d, there are no taste shocks in the detrended Arrow
model, and from (25) we see that then interest rates are deterministic. The gap between ˆ Qτ(zτ|zt)
and   Qt,τ is zero and no Arrow securities are traded in equilibrium, conﬁrming the results in section
3.1.
In order to close our argument, we need to show that no initial wealth transfers between
individuals are required for this implementation. In other words, the initial Arrow securities
position ˆ a−1(θ0,y−1,z0) implied by (27) at time 0, is zero for all households.15
To do so we proceed in two steps. First, we show that average time zero state prices in the
Arrow model coincide with the state prices in the Bewley model. For this result to hold our
15Without this argument we merely would have shown that a Bewley equilibrium for initial condition Θ0 can be
implemented as equilibrium of the de-trended Arrow model with initial conditions z0 and some initial distribution
Ψ0 of wealth, but not necessarily Θ0.




for the Bewley model is crucial.
Lemma 4.2. The conjectured prices for the Arrow model in (23) and the prices in the Bewley
model deﬁned in (22) satisfy  
zτ
ˆ Qτ(z
τ|z0) = ˜ Qτ
Finally, using this result we can establish that no wealth transfers are necessary to implement
the Bewley equilibrium as equilibrium in the de-trended Arrow model.
Lemma 4.3. The Arrow securities position at time 0 given in (27) is zero:
ˆ a−1(θ0,y
−1,z0) = 0.
The Bewley equilibrium therefore is an equilibrium for the de-trended Arrow model with the
same initial wealth distribution Θ0. This result then immediately implies the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. An equilibrium of the Bewley model {ˆ ct(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)} and { ˆ Rt,ˆ vt} where house-




can be implemented as an equilibrium for the
Arrow model with growth, {at(θ0,st,zt+1)}, {σt(θ0,st)}, {ct(θ0,st)} and {qt(zt,zt+1)}, {vt(zt)},
with
ct(θ0,s




t) = ˆ σt(θ0,y
t)
at(θ0,s
t,zt+1) = ˆ at(θ0,y
t,zt+1)et+1(z
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Risk Premia Of course, this result implies that our baseline irrelevance result for risk pre-
mia survives the introduction of non-i.i.d. aggregate shocks, provided that a complete menu of









ˆ Rt  βt+1
= κt
is still deterministic, and thus the proofs of section 3.6 go through unchanged. These aggregate
taste shocks only aﬀect interest rates and price/dividend ratios, not risk premia. When agents in
23the transformed model become more impatient, the interest rate rises and the price/dividend ratio
falls, but the conditional expected excess return is unchanged.
Solvency Constraints So far, we have abstracted from binding solvency constraints. Previ-
ously, we assumed that the solvency constraints satisfy Kt(st) = ˆ Kt(yt)et(zt) and Mt+1(st+1) =
ˆ Mt(yt)et(zt+1). The allocations in theorem 4.2 derived from the stationary model using ˆ Kt(yt)
and ˆ Mt(yt) as solvency constraints do not necessarily satisfy the solvency constraints given by
Kt(st) = ˆ Kt(yt)et(zt) and Mt+1(st+1) = ˆ Mt(yt)et(zt+1), but they satisfy modiﬁed solvency con-
straints.





























where ˆ vt is the (deterministic) Bewley equilibrium stock price.
If the allocations satisfy the constraints in the stationary Bewley model, they satisfy the mod-
iﬁed solvency constraints (28) or (29) in the actual Arrow model, but not the ones we originally
speciﬁed, because of the nonzero state-contingent claims positions. These violations of the origi-
nal constraints are completely due to the impact of interest rate shocks on the value of the asset
portfolio.
Finally, in the Bond model, our previous equivalence result no longer holds, since with pre-
dictability in aggregate consumption growth households trade state-contingent claims in the equi-
librium of the Arrow model. Unless the aggregate shock can only take two values, the market
structure of the Bond model prevents them from doing so, and thus our implementation and irrel-
evance results in this model are not robust to the introduction of non-i.i.d aggregate endowment
growth.
5 Conclusion
We have derived conditions under which the history of a household’s idiosyncratic shocks has no
eﬀect on his portfolio choice, even in the presence of binding solvency constraints. This portfolio
irrelevance result directly implies our risk premium irrelevance result. Since all households bear
the same amount of aggregate risk in equilibrium, the history of aggregate shocks does not af-
fect equilibrium prices and allocations. The equilibrium risk-free rate, the risk premium and the
price/dividend ratio are all deterministic, at least in the benchmark model without predictabil-
ity in aggregate consumption growth. However, only a weaker version of this irrelevance result
24survives in economies with a predictable component in aggregate consumption growth (see e.g.
Bansal and Yaron (2004)), because the associated interest rate risk gives rise to heterogeneous
hedging demands that do depend on the household’s history of idiosyncratic shocks. Surprisingly,
the impact of idiosyncratic risk on risk premia depends critically on the predictability of aggregate
consumption growth, but it does not depend at all on the persistence or variance of household
labor income.
Other than predictability in aggregate consumption growth shocks, there are two main avenues
around our results. One approach is to concentrate aggregate risk by forcing some households out of
the stock market altogether. This is the approach adopted in the literature on limited participation
(see e.g. Guvenen (2003), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Gomes and Michaelides (2007) and Attanasio,
Banks, and Tanner (2002)). The second approach consists of concentrating labor income risk in
recessions. Recently Krusell and Smith (1997) and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007) have
argued that models with idiosyncratic income shocks and incomplete markets can generate an
equity premium that is substantially larger than the CCAPM if there is counter-cyclical cross-
sectional variance (CCV) in labor income shocks. Our paper demonstrates analytically that CCV
in labor income, limited stock market participation or some form of predictability in aggregate
consumption growth is necessary to make uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks potentially
useful for explaining the equity premium.
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A Equilibrium in Arrow Model
The deﬁnition of an equilibrium in the Arrow model is standard. Each household is assigned a label that consists of
its initial ﬁnancial wealth θ0 and its initial state s0 = (y0,z0). A household of type (θ0,s0) then chooses consumption
allocations {ct(θ0,st)}, trading strategies for Arrow securities {at(θ0,st,zt+1)} and shares {σt(θ0,st)} to maximize
her expected utility (1), subject to the budget constraints (4) and subject to solvency constraints (6) or (7).
Deﬁnition A.1. For initial aggregate state z0 and distribution Θ0 over (θ0,y0), a competitive equilibrium for the
Arrow model consists of household allocations {at(θ0,st,zt+1)}, {σt(θ0,st)}, {ct(θ0,st)} and prices {qt(zt,zt+1)},
{vt(zt)} such that
1. Given prices, household allocations solve the household maximization problem
272. The goods market clears for all zt,





3. The asset markets clear for all zt









at(θ0,st,zt+1)dΘ0 = 0 for all zt+1 ∈ Z
A.1 Optimality Conditions for De-trended Arrow Model
Deﬁne the Lagrange multiplier
ˆ β(st)ˆ π(st|s0)u′(ˆ ct(st))ˆ µ(st) ≥ 0









































Only one of the two Lagrange multipliers enters the equations, depending on which version of the solvency constraint











ˆ at(st,zt+1) + ˆ σt(st)
 



















































Since the household optimization has a concave objective function and a convex constraint set the ﬁrst order
conditions and complementary slackness conditions, together with the transversality condition, are necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for optimality of household allocation choices.
B Proofs
• Proof of Proposition 3.1:
Proof. We use U(c)(st) to denote the continuation utility of an agent from consumption stream c, starting
at history st. This continuation utility follows the simple recursion




where it is understood that (st,st+1) = (zt,zt+1,yt,yt+1). Divide both sides by et(st)1−γ to obtain
U(c)(st)








Deﬁne a new continuation utility index ˆ U(·) as follows:




ˆ U(ˆ c)(st) = u(ˆ ct(st)) + β
 
st+1
π(st+1|st)λ(zt+1)1−γ ˆ U(ˆ c)(st,st+1).
= u(ˆ ct(st)) + ˆ β(st)
 
st+1
ˆ π(st+1|st)ˆ U(ˆ c)(st,st+1).
Thus it follows, for two consumption streams c and c′, that
U(c)(st) ≥ U(c′)(st) if and only if ˆ U(ˆ c)(st) ≥ ˆ U(ˆ c′)(st),
i.e., the household orders original and growth-deﬂated consumption streams in exactly the same way.
• Proof of Theorem 3.1:
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. In a ﬁrst step, we argue that the Bewley equilibrium allocations
and prices can be transformed into an equilibrium for the de-trended Arrow model, and in a second step, we
29argue that by scaling the allocations and prices by the appropriate endowment (growth) factors, we obtain
an equilibrium of the stochastically growing Arrow model.
Step 1: Take allocations and prices from a Bewley equilibrium, {ˆ ct(yt),ˆ at(yt), ˆ σt(yt)},{ ˆ Rt, ˆ vt} and let the







for the constraint in (14) and
ˆ βtϕ(yt|y0)u′(ˆ ct(yt))ˆ κt(yt) ≥ 0,
for the constraint in (15). The ﬁrst order conditions (which are necessary and suﬃcient for household optimal
choices together with the complementary slackness and transversality conditions) in the Bewley model, once
combined to the Euler equations, are given by:






+ ˆ µt(yt) + ˆ Rtˆ κt(yt). (32)
= ˆ β
 
ˆ vt+1 + α
ˆ vt





+ ˆ µt(yt) +
 




The corresponding Euler equations for the de-trended Arrow model, evaluated at the Bewley equilibrium
































Evaluated at the conjectured prices,





and using the independence and i.i.d. assumptions, which imply
ˆ π(st+1|st) = ϕ(yt+1|yt)ˆ φ(zt+1)
ˆ β(st) = ˆ β
30these Euler equations can be restated as follows:
1 =







+ ˆ µt(yt) + ˆ Rtˆ κt(yt). (36)














+ˆ µt(yt) + ˆ κt(yt)
 
ˆ vt+1 + α
ˆ vt
   
zt+1
ˆ φ(zt+1),
which are, given that
 
zt+1
ˆ φ(zt+1) = 1, exactly the Euler conditions (32) and (33) of the Bewley model
and hence satisﬁed by the Bewley equilibrium allocations. A similar argument applies to the complementary













ˆ at(yt) + ˆ σt(yt)(ˆ vt+1 + α) − ˆ Mt(yt)
 
= 0, (39)

















ˆ at(yt) + ˆ σt(yt)[ˆ vt+1 + α] − ˆ Mt(yt)
 
= 0/ˆ φ(zt+1).
Again, the Bewley equilibrium allocations satisfy the complementary slackness conditions in the de-trended
Arrow model. The argument is exactly identical for the transversality conditions. Finally, we have to check







ˆ φ(zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)ˆ vt ≤ η(yt) + ˆ at−1(yt−1) + σt−1(yt−1)[ˆ vt + α], (40)
which is exactly the budget constraint in the Bewley model. Thus, given the conjectured prices, the Bewley
equilibrium allocations are optimal in the de-trended Arrow model.
Since the market clearing conditions for assets and consumption goods coincide in the two models, Bewley
allocations satisfy the market clearing conditions in the de-trended Arrow model. Thus we conclude that
the Bewley equilibrium allocations, together with prices (34) and (35) are an equilibrium in the de-trended
Arrow model.
Step 2: Now, we need to show that an equilibrium of the de-trended Arrow model is, after appropriate scaling,
an equilibrium in the stochastically growing model, but this was established in section 3.2, in which we showed
that by with the transformations ˆ ct(st) =
ct(s
t)
et(zt), ˆ at(st,zt+1) =
at(s
t,zt+1)
et+1(zt+1), ˆ σt(st) = σt(st), ˆ qt(zt,zt+1) =
qt(zt,zt+1)λ(zt+1), ˆ vt(zt) =
vt(z
t)
et(zt) household problems and market clearing conditions in the de-trended and
the stochastically growing Arrow model coincide.
31• Proof of Lemma 3.1:










































Thus the representative agent stochastic discount factor βλ(zt+1)−γ prices the excess return of stocks over
bonds in both the Arrow and the Bond model. Note that in the Arrow model (but not in the Bond model)
this stochastic discount factor any excess return Ri
t+1−Rt as long as the returns only depend on the aggregate
state zt+1.
• Proof of Proposition 3.2:
































= κt ≥ 1 (41)
where
ˆ RRE













is the risk-free interest rate in the de-trended representative agent model. Note that the multiplicative factor
κt may depend on time since ˆ RA
t may, but is nonstochastic, since ˆ RA
t = ˆ Rt (the risk-free interest rate in the
de-trended Arrow model equals that in the Bewley model, which is evidently nonstochastic). Since interest
rates in the Bewley model are (weakly) smaller than in the representative agent model, κt ≥ 1. Equation (41)
implies that the stochastic discount factor in the Arrow model equals the SDF in the representative agent




32Finally, since the stochastic discount factor for the Arrow model is also a valid stochastic discount factor in
the Bond model (although not necessarily the unique valid stochastic discount factor), the previous result
also applies to the Bond model.
• Proof of Theorem 3.2:
Proof. Remember that we deﬁned the multiplicative risk premium in the main text as
1 + νt =
EtRt,1 [{et+k}]
Rt,1 [1]
We use mt,t+k = mt+1 · mt+2 ... · mt+k to denote the k-period ahead pricing kernel (with convention that
mt,t = 1), such that Et(dt+kmt,t+k) denotes the price at time t of a random payoﬀ dt+k. Note that whenever
there is no room for confusion we suppress the dependence of variables on zt.
First, note that the multiplicative risk premium on a claim to aggregate consumption can be stated as
a weighted sum of risk premia on strips (as shown by Alvarez and Jermann (2001)). By deﬁnition of
Rt,1 [{et+k}] we have
Rt,1 [{et+k}] =
 ∞







































and it is suﬃcient to show that the multiplicative risk premium EtRt,1 [et+k]/Rt,1 [1] on all k-period strips
of aggregate consumption (a claim to the Lucas tree’s dividend in period k only, not the entire stream) is
the same in the Arrow model as in the representative agent model. First, we show that the one-period ahead
























The ﬁrst equality follows from dividing through by et. The second equality follows from the expression for
mA in Proposition 3.2: mA
t+1 = mRE
t+1κt.
































and thus risk premia on all k-period consumption strips in the Arrow model coincide with those in the
representative agent model. But then (45) implies that the multiplicative risk premium in the two models
coincide as well.
• Proof of Lemma 4.1:


































these equations obviously coin-
cide with the bond Euler equation in the Bewley model, and thus the Bewley equilibrium allocation satisﬁes
the Euler equations for Arrow securities. A similar argument applies to the Euler equation for stocks:





ˆ vt+1(zt+1) + α
ˆ vt(zt)




















ˆ Rt  βt+1
which can easily be veriﬁed from equation (24).
• Proof of Proposition 4.1:
Proof. We need to check that Arrow securities positions deﬁned in (27) satisfy the market clearing condition
   
yt−1
ϕ(yt−1|y0)ˆ at−1(θ0,yt−1,zt)dΘ0 = 0 for all zt.
34for each zt. By the goods market clearing condition in the Bewley model we have, since total labor income
makes up a fraction 1 − α of total income

























ˆ ct(yt,θ0) − η(yt)
 
dΘ0 = α





ϕ(yτ|yt)[ˆ cτ(θ0,yτ) − η(yτ)]dΘ0 = α for all τ > t
Since the stock market clears in the Bewley model we have





Since the stock is a claim to α times the aggregate endowment in all future periods its (ex-dividend) price
has to satisfy






Combining these results implies that
   
yt
ϕ(yt|y0)ˆ at−1(θ0,yt−1,zt)dΘ0















for each zt. Thus, each of the Arrow securities markets clears if households hold portfolios given by (27).
• Proof of Lemma 4.2:
Proof. By (23)
ˆ Qt(z





















ˆ φ(zt−1|z0)ˆ β0,t−1(zt−1|z0) = ˜ Qt.
by deﬁnition of   βt in equation (21) and the fact that
 
zt|zt−1 ˆ φ(zt|zt−1) = 1.
• Proof of Lemma 4.3:
35Proof. The Arrow securities position at time zero needed to ﬁnance all future excess consumption mandated
by the Bewley equilibrium is given by





ˆ Qτ(zτ|z0)(ˆ cτ(θ0,yτ) − η(yτ))
−ˆ σ0(θ0,y0)[ˆ v0(z0) + α],
where we substituted indexes −1 by 0 to denote initial conditions. In particular, ˆ σ0(θ0,y0) is the initial share
position of an individual with wealth θ0. But
ˆ a−1(θ0,y0,z0).





ˆ Qτ(zτ|z0)ϕ(yτ|y0)(ˆ cτ(θ0,yτ) − η(yτ)) − ˆ σ0(θ0,y0)[ˆ v0(z0) + α].



































where the last equality comes from the intertemporal budget constraint in the standard incomplete markets
Bewley model and the fact that the initial share position in that model is given by ˆ σ0(θ0,y0).
• Proof of Proposition 4.2:
Proof. The stationary Bewley allocation {ˆ aB




+ ˆ σt(yt)ˆ vt ≥ ˆ Kt(yt). (46)
Using the fact that ˆ aB
t (yt) = 0 and adding
 
zt+1
ˆ qt(zt+1|zt)ˆ at(yt,zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)ˆ vt(zt)
to both sides of (46) yields
 
zt+1
ˆ qt(zt+1|zt)ˆ at(yt,zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)ˆ vt(zt)
≥ ˆ Kt(yt) +
 
zt+1






t (yt) is the modiﬁed constraint for the de-trended Arrow model. Multiplying both sides by et(zt)
gives the modiﬁed constraint for the Arrow model with growth stated in the main text. For the alternative
36constraint, we know that the Bewley equilibrium allocation satisﬁes
ˆ aB
t (yt) + ˆ σt(yt)[ˆ vt+1 + α] ≥ ˆ Mt(yt). (47)
Again using ˆ aB
t (yt) = 0 and adding
ˆ at(y
t,zt+1) + ˆ σt(y
t)[ˆ vt+1(zt+1) + α]
to both sides of (46) yields
ˆ at(yt,zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)[ˆ vt+1(zt+1) + α]
≥ ˆ Mt(yt) + ˆ at(yt,zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)[ˆ vt+1(zt+1) − ˆ vt+1]
≡ ˆ M∗
t (yt,zt+1)
Multiplying both sides by et+1(zt+1) again gives rise to the constraint stated in the main text.
37